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SHELBY COUNTY AS A SANCTION FOR STATES’ RIGHTS IN 
ELECTIONS 
JOSHUA S. SELLERS* 
Few Supreme Court decisions are both intensely debated by the public and 
ultimately transformative. Most decisions either do not register in the 
mainstream or do not produce their anticipated consequences. The Court’s 
2013 decision, Shelby County v. Holder,1 however, is a notable exception. The 
Court’s acceptance of the case was widely reported on.2 The decision itself was 
highly anticipated.3 And an abundance of commentary on the decision has 
followed.4 As such, it is salient in a way that most decisions are not. But it is 
also uniquely consequential. The decision dismantled the nation’s long-
established voting rights enforcement regime and, in turn, engendered a 
plethora of controversial state and local voting laws regarding voter 
identification, voter registration, and voter access that have resulted in racial 
and ethnic voter discrimination. 
Since the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was passed in 1965, the federal 
government has enjoyed substantial authority in regulating elections, 
particularly when issues of race are implicated.5 Shelby County not only curbed 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author would like to thank 
the participants in Syracuse University’s Law and Courts Research Workshop for very helpful 
comments. 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 2. Adam Liptak, Justices to Revisit Voting Act in View of a Changing South, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2012; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to review key section of Voting Rights Act, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 9, 2012; Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, High Court to Review Voting Rights, DNA 
Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2012. 
 3. For instance, SCOTUSblog organized an online symposium in advance of the decision. 
See Online Symposium Announcement: Shelby County v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 7, 2013, 
4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/online-symposium-announcement-shelby-county-
v-holder/. 
 4. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 713 (2014); Samuel Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on 
Voting Rights after Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014); Nicholas Stephanopolous, The South 
After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55 (2013); Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the 
Record?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 329 (2013); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s 
Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481 (2014). 
 5. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 4, at 485. 
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that authority—by rendering Section 5 of the VRA, the so-called “preclearance 
provision,” moot—but also signaled, in its language, that the VRA is no longer 
constitutionally sacrosanct. Viewed in isolation, the decision might be read as 
simply a soft rebuke of Congress’s failure to update the VRA to better address 
contemporary voting rights-related problems.6 Alternatively, and more 
accurately, I argue, the decision marked a culminating event in the resurgence 
of “states’ rights” efforts. 
Specifically, the decision was seemingly informed by, and can be 
understood in combination with, the resurgence of arguments and actions in 
support of nullification, interposition, and states’ rights. The doctrine of 
nullification and the concept of interposition are evoked when states enact laws 
or adopt measures in direct defiance of federal law.7 Actions taken in 
furtherance of states’ rights, in contrast, do not categorically involve direct 
defiance of federal law, and may instead merely implicate unresolved, and 
therefore more legitimate, questions about the limits of federal power vis-à-vis 
the states. Unfortunately, the language used in support of nullification, 
interposition, and states’ rights arguments, respectively, is often quite similar. 
And the language in Shelby County regarding state sovereignty in the voting 
rights arena gives credence to all such arguments. Consequently, the decision 
gave the Court’s imprimatur to states that are actively, and contentiously, 
testing the boundaries of permissible voting-related changes. 
This essay examines both the ideational and observable effects of Shelby 
County. Part I summarizes the decision’s constituent parts, including its 
dubious reliance on “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty.” Part II 
relates the decision to resurgent attempts to vindicate nullification, 
interposition, and states’ rights efforts. Part III reviews the controversial voting 
laws that several states passed both immediately prior to and immediately 
following the decision, interpreting them as symbolic of states’ emboldened 
sense of authority in the electoral arena. A conclusion briefly discusses a likely 
implication of this shift in the federal-state voting rights enforcement 
balance—a constitutional challenge to Section 2 of the VRA. 
I.  SECTION 5, SHELBY COUNTY, AND “EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY” 
Congress initially passed the VRA in response to the systematic and 
blatant denial of the right to vote to vast numbers of African Americans. 
 
 6. See id. at 484 (noting, though not defending, the view that “Shelby County could have 
been worse, a lot worse. It is possible to read Shelby County as a narrow and arguably minimalist 
opinion.”). 
 7. See Christian G. Fritz, Interposition and the Heresy of Nullification: James Madison and 
the Exercise of Sovereign Constitutional Powers, HERITAGE FOUND., Feb. 21, 2012, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/interposition-and-heresy-of-nullification-james-
madison-exercise-of-sovereign-constitutional-powers. 
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Section 5, the preclearance provision, was always the most controversial 
element of the statute. The provision placed select jurisdictions (mostly in the 
South) under what is commonly referred to as a type of “federal receivership,” 
mandating that they obtain preclearance from either the Department of Justice 
or a three-judge panel of the US District Court for the District of Columbia for 
any change related to a voting qualification or prerequisite to voting.8 The 
primary evidentiary burden lay with the covered jurisdictions, which needed to 
demonstrate that their voting-related changes would not make minority voters 
any worse off. Thus, the statute aimed to prohibit backsliding, or what judges 
labeled “retrogression.”9 
Predictably, Section 5 was strongly opposed by jurisdictions subject to the 
preclearance provision. For nearly fifty years, however, the Court upheld the 
provision’s constitutionality whenever it was challenged.10Constitutional 
concerns were elevated, though, following Congress’s 2006 decision to 
reauthorize Section 5 for twenty-five additional years.11 The principal 
questions raised by many at the time were whether the preclearance regime 
was still justifiable in light of changed political conditions, and given improved 
race relations.12 Those questions were first given formal expression in the 
Court’s decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. 
Holder (“NAMUDNO”).13 
Though the Court avoided resolution of the constitutional question in 
NAMUDNO, the decision characterized Section 5 as “authoriz[ing] federal 
intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking that [impose] 
 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000) (“Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to 
which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(b) . . . are in effect shall enact or seek to 
administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure 
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, . . . such State 
or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or 
procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color.”). 
 9. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
 10. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966); Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, 535 (1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177, 179 (1980); Lopez v. 
Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 283–84 (1999). 
 11. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE 
L.J. 174, 189–92 (2007) (discussing some of these concerns). 
 12. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Next Generation, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION 
OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 17, 22–25 (Guy-
Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011). Similar concerns were raised in preceding years. See Samuel 
Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1710, 1728 (2004). 
 13. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
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substantial federalism costs.”14 This quotation is drawn from the Court’s 
decision in Lopez v. Monterey County,15 where the Court additionally noted 
that with regard to legislation, like the VRA, passed pursuant to the Fifteenth 
Amendment, “some intrusion into areas traditionally reserved to the States” 
was to be expected.16 Chief Justice Roberts’s selective quotation of Lopez in 
NAMUDNO is therefore instructive. Even in reaching the same outcome in 
NAMUDNO, the chief justice might have framed the voting rights enforcement 
regime as something akin to a “harmonious system,”17 in which state 
governments share responsibility with the federal government. He might have 
emphasized the collaborative nature of state and federal election law 
practices.18 Instead, he misleadingly extracted a decidedly caustic phrase—
“federal intrusion”—that disguises the holding of the case from which it was 
drawn and evokes some of our nation’s most contentious eras.19 
NAMUDNO foreshadowed the Court’s decision in Shelby County. In 
Shelby County, the chief justice once again opted for intemperate language 
about federal encroachment, eliding any engagement with dynamic, interactive 
theories of federalism. His opinion framed our federal system as one in which 
“States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing 
legislative objectives.”20 His inflammatory portrayal of the Section 5 process—
“States must beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement 
laws that they otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own”21—
bolsters an unproductive conception of states as mere protectorates of the 
federal government. 
The decision also heavily relied on what it deemed the “‘fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”22 Historically, that principle 
only applied to the terms upon which new states would be admitted to the 
 
 14. Id. at 200 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)). 
 15. 525 U.S. 266 (1999). 
 16. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282. 
 17. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 386 (1880). 
 18. See Kirsten Nussbaumer, The Election Law Connection and U.S. Federalism, 43 
PUBLIUS 392, 396–97 (2013) (“The electoral interest of federal officials in state and local 
decision-making about federal elections is not always felt at a distance, away from the scene of 
the action, but may be expressed in information-sharing, lobbying, and other actions that are 
aimed at influencing the various stages of state rule formation and implementation, ranging, for 
example, from strategy and negotiations about the design of state electoral initiatives to the 
sharing of litigation funds and personnel in the heat of a disputed election count.”). 
 19. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202. 
 20. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 2624. 
 22. Id. at 2621 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203). 
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Union;23 it was not considered a principle governing the terms of remedial 
legislation. Chief Justice Roberts first refashioned the principle’s import in 
NAMUDNO, in claiming that “a departure from the fundamental principle of 
equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic 
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”24 This dubious 
interpretation of the principle was irrelevant to the Court’s holding in 
NAMUDNO, and was decidedly instrumental insofar as it provided a precedent 
(albeit in dicta) for Chief Justice Roberts to later rely on in Shelby County.25 
In deciding Shelby County, then, Chief Justice Roberts interpreted his own 
disputable interpretation of the equal sovereignty principle in NAMUDNO as 
essentially dispositive.26 What did this interpretation really signify? One 
possibility is that the Court is simply confused about the nature of our election 
law framework, and thereby privileges a faulty notion of state sovereignty, 
which the equal sovereignty principle reflects. Franita Tolson is a leading 
proponent of this view: 
The Supreme Court conflates state autonomy with state sovereignty in the 
context of the VRA, in effect promoting the dualist undertones that 
characterize much of its federalism case law and giving the states significantly 
more power over elections than they otherwise would have. Its voting rights 
jurisprudence presupposes that the states retain a large amount of 
“sovereignty” over elections, leaving room for the Court to characterize the 
federal/state relationship over elections as one of shared power instead of 
viewing the state as subordinate to federal authority. The view of electoral 
authority as “shared” has led the Court to defer more to the states over the 
matter of elections. This deference is due in part to the misconception that 
placing meaningful limits on congressional authority extends to all federalism 
 
 23. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 4, at 519 (“Prior to [NAMUDNO], the 
argument for ‘equal sovereignty’ was generally understood as applicable only at the time of 
admission.”). 
 24. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203. 
 25. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 4, at 519 (“The Chief Justice attributed the 
‘fundamental principle’ to the Court’s decision in [NAMUDNO]. But [NAMUDNO] simply 
asserted the point and provided no support for the assertion.”). It is for this reason that Richard 
Hasen categorized the Court’s decision in NAMUDNO as an “anticipatory overruling.” Richard L. 
Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme 
Court Justices Move the Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 779, 782–83 (2011–2012). 
 26. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 665 (“[A]s we made clear in Northwest Austin, the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent 
disparate treatment of States.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 100–01 (2013) (“While the equal dignity requirement may be of 
questionable original constitutional pedigree, the foundation was set in NAMUDNO, a decision 
that was joined by the Court’s liberal wing—as Chief Justice Roberts recounted with some 
obvious glee.”). 
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issues, including those issues such as elections, which are not truly “federalist” 
in nature but instead reflect a decentralized system of authority.27 
While this perspective has merit, I believe the aforementioned word and phrase 
choices made by the chief justice represent more than just a commitment to 
extending the so-called “federalism revolution.”28 
More convincing, in my view, are arguments that the Shelby County 
decision represents a rejection of the principal ideational presumption of the 
civil rights era—namely, that absent federal oversight, state governments, and 
particularly state governments in the Deep South, cannot be trusted to equalize 
civil and voting rights for minorities. This presumption has always been an 
important dimension of the VRA, and specifically the Section 5 regime. For 
instance, in recounting President Johnson’s push for a voting rights bill, Hugh 
Davis Graham notes the following: 
[N]o voting rights law had really worked since Reconstruction. This of course 
was part of the problem, because the federal manipulation of the postbellum 
franchise had stained the memory of Reconstruction with partisan corruption, 
and this legacy of “Black Reconstruction” had long provided conservatives 
with powerful practical as well as constitutional arguments for hedging the 
voting rights provisions of 1957, 1960, and even 1964 with elaborate judicial 
due process. The voting (and nonvoting) patterns of 1964, however, had 
demonstrated the bankruptcy of this good-faith approach in the face of so 
much blatant bad faith.29 
Section 5 was an aggressive response to this “blatant bad faith.” 
Consequently, Shelby County is best viewed as a reactionary decision that 
resists the presumption that states are untrustworthy guardians of equality. 
Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer endorse this interpretation in 
writing that “Shelby County is not simply about recalibrating the federal-state 
balance; the majority is after bigger game here. Shelby County is also about the 
redemption of the South. The Shelby County majority seeks to redeem the 
States and the South from the past.”30 Samuel Issacharoff reads the case 
similarly: “In reality, the equal sovereignty doctrine captures less the constant 
differentiation of the states for purposes of routine legislative enactments than 
the perceived continued stain on the South from its racialist past. The issue was 
 
 27. Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting 
Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1258 (2012). 
 28. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD 
TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATIVISM 235–43 (2004) (summarizing the relevant case law). 
 29. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATIONAL POLICY 163 (1990). 
 30. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 4, at 522. 
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never addressed forthrightly by the majority but its presence was 
everywhere.”31 
Viewed accordingly, Shelby County is much more than just an 
admonishment of Congress for failing to update Section 5’s coverage formula 
to better reflect current conditions. It is, more accurately, an approbation of 
states’ primacy in election-related matters, and an invitation to states to assert 
that primacy. It is an ideational reclamation project of sorts that paints the 
federal government as a meddlesome intruder that proscribes states from 
“passing laws that they otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their 
own.”32 As argued in Part II, this characterization sounds in the controversial 
doctrines of nullification, interposition, and states’ rights. 
II.  SHELBY COUNTY AND THE SOUNDS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
In recent years there has been a revival of discussion about nullification, 
interposition, and states’ rights. So much so that leading constitutional scholars 
have been asked to debate the lawfulness of the doctrines on National Public 
Radio,33 and last year, the Arkansas Law Review even organized a symposium 
to address the doctrines’ contemporary legitimacy.34 In short, doctrines once 
thought dead have reemerged as, at the very least, conversation-worthy. 
Nullification, defined as “a theory advocating a state’s right to declare a 
federal law unconstitutional and therefore void,”35 is the most radical of the 
three, insofar as it promotes giving states a degree of power the other doctrines 
do not. That said, most scholars deem it outlandish. For example, Sanford 
Levinson describes the conventional view that 
any suggestion of so-called “sovereign states” having the power to “nullify” 
federal law is utter nonsense. No federal judge (or, for that matter, all but the 
most deviant state counterpart) is going to uphold state authority against the 
Supremacy Clause in Article VI, which clearly and unequivocally gives all 
laws passed pursuant to the Constitution the power to negate any state laws—
or, indeed, state constitutions—to the contrary.36 
 
 31. Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 101. 
 32. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013). 
 33. On Point with Tom Ashbrook, NPR, Mar. 23, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
rcgbNVenUTA. 
 34. Mark R. Killenbeck, Symposium Introduction: Bad Company?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 1 
(2014). 
 35. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1830 (10th ed. 2014). 
 36. Sanford Levinson, The Twenty-First Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession 
in American Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate or Serious Arguments to Be Wrestled 
With?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 17, 31–32 (2014). 
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Jack Rakove writes, “Nullification is a terribly interesting argument, but it is 
neither part of the Constitution nor consistent with its meaning.”37 Mark 
Brandon claims, “Even if one recognizes an implied and later explicit 
reservation of powers in the several states, it is impossible to imagine that 
nullification was constitutionally permissible, even in the earliest years of the 
republic (well before the Fourteenth Amendment), when states continued to 
exercise expansive authority.”38 Sean Wilentz, writing in the New Republic, 
chastises those he labels “new nullifiers” for their attempts to “repudiate the 
sacrifices of American history—and subvert the constitutional pillars of 
American nationhood.”39 Ari Berman, the Nation magazine’s voting rights 
columnist, titled a recent column criticizing several states’ restrictive election 
laws “The New Nullification Movement.”40 In short, nullification lacks 
endorsers.41 
The related concept of interposition, defined as “[t]he action of a state, in 
the exercise of its sovereignty, rejecting a federal mandate that it believes is 
unconstitutional or overreaching,”42 is slightly less confrontational. However, 
what it exactly entails is uncertain. Levinson concludes that interposition “can 
mean only that states—like any citizen—are free to articulate their views about 
the possible unconstitutionality of national laws and to attempt to generate a 
national movement to repeal those laws.”43 Rakove concurs, connecting the 
concept to James Madison’s 1798 Virginia Resolution: 
In thinking about the role that states could play in checking constitutionally 
dubious policies, Madison was careful to remain consistent with his analysis of 
1787−88. That is, he never thought of the states as retaining an independent 
legal authority to prevent the implementation of duly adopted national laws, 
but their political capacity remained intact. As the original compacting parties 
 
 37. Jack N. Rakove, Some Hollow Hopes of States’-Rights Advocates, 67 ARK. L. REV. 81, 
85 (2014). 
 38. Mark E. Brandon, Secession and Nullification in the Twenty-First Century, 67 ARK. L. 
REV. 91, 97 (2014). 
 39. Sean Wilentz, States of Anarchy: America’s Long, Sordid Affair with Nullification, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/the-essence-anarchy. 
 40. Ari Berman, The New Nullification Movement, NATION, Oct. 23, 2014, http://www.the 
nation.com/article/176808/new-nullification-movement# (“In reality, the two-tiered system of 
registration being set up in Arizona and Kansas has far less to do with stopping voter registration 
fraud (which, as shown, is very rare in both states) than with ‘nullifying’ federal laws that 
Republicans don’t like, such as Obamacare. There’s a symmetry between shutting down the 
government and creating separate and unequal systems of voting.”). 
 41. But see THOMAS E. WOODS, NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY (2010). 
 42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 333 (9th ed. 2009). 
 43. Levinson, supra note 36, at 42. 
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to the Union, states had not forfeited their rights to express political opinions 
and, thus, mobilize opposition to positions they found objectionable.44 
Thus, interposition, responsibly defined,45 serves a kind of expressive function 
through which states can oppose the constitutionality of federal laws. 
The concept of states’ rights refers more broadly to a multitude of efforts 
to preserve state sovereignty, including the bringing of legal challenges. By 
comparison with nullification and interposition, it has much more of a 
contemporary resonance, rendering arguments made under its banner more 
legitimate.46 Unfortunately, however, for its advocates, that resonance is in part 
due to the use of states’ rights arguments in opposition to desegregation.47 Yet, 
as acknowledged by Rakove, “[t]hough one may give states’ rights a hard 
edge—equating it with the capacity to resist exercises of national authority—
one may also use the term to identify areas of governance where the states 
have some residual power to act.”48 This understanding can be aligned with the 
Court’s cases in recent decades finding some Tenth Amendment-based 
limitations on congressional power,49 which purport to establish workable 
limits on Congress, rather than the complete independence of states. 
How, then, does Shelby County fit with these doctrines? Most notably, it 
underwrites states’ enactments of new, discriminatory voting rules and 
regulations. To be sure, not every action of this type was taken in direct 
response to Shelby County,50 though many certainly were.51 But, as argued 
above, the ideational thrust of the decision countenances such actions. John 
Dinan, writing about recent states’ rights efforts in opposition to federal 
 
 44. Rakove, supra note 37, at 85–86. 
 45. I say “responsibly” because, as referenced by Levinson, the concept of interposition was 
employed by Southern segregationists as grounds for rejecting the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharpe. Levinson, supra note 36, at 45 n.159. 
 46. See Adam Liptak, Suit Cites States’ Rights on Behalf of Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/us/an-unexpected-alliance-in-a-same-sex-marriage-
case.html?_r=0; Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/17states.html. 
 47. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 163 (4th ed. 2005) 
(noting that “much of th[e] disdain for ‘states’-rights’ arguments was triggered by the traditional 
use of such arguments to justify racial oppression or the harassment of those with unpopular 
political or cultural views”); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 752 (1975). 
 48. Rakove, supra note 37, at 82. 
 49. See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 50. See Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, N.Y.U. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING 
PAPERS 9 n.26 (2014). 
 51. Statewide and Local Responses to the Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Act Decision: June 
25, 2013 – Present, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, Feb. 18, 2015, available at 
http://www.naacpldf.org/document/states-responses-shelby-decision. 
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firearm and health care initiatives, provides an apt description of what is 
occurring in the election law context as well: 
[S]tates have various opportunities to exploit or anticipate changes in Supreme 
Court doctrine that create uncertainty about the legitimacy or applicability of 
federal directives. This is illustrated by the recent passage of state firearms and 
health freedom statutes. In neither case have states nullified federal laws in the 
sense of declaring them void or defying direct federal judicial orders. Rather, 
states enacted statutes that are intended to serve as vehicles for generating a 
Supreme Court case to determine the legitimate reach of congressional 
power.52 
Shelby County buoyed such efforts in the election law context with its 
intimations of state sovereignty 
Part of the connection between Shelby County and states’ efforts to restrict 
access to the franchise is merely semantic. That is, the specific language 
employed by states in defense of their restrictive voting laws sounds in 
nullification, interposition, and states’ rights. For instance, two days after the 
Shelby County ruling, the state of Alabama announced the immediate 
implementation of a voter identification law that civil rights groups claimed 
would have a discriminatory effect on minority voters. Prior to the ruling that 
enactment would have required preclearance. In making the announcement, 
Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange asserted that the Court’s decision 
“frees Alabama and other states from cumbersome and unreasonable federal 
oversight.”53 
The state of Mississippi also implemented a voter identification law in the 
immediate wake of Shelby County. In response to the decision, US Senator 
Roger Wicker stated: “Today’s decision is a good step in returning power back 
to the states. As the Court noted, the criteria being used by the Justice 
Department to implement portions of the ‘Voting Rights Act’ are outdated. I 
welcome today’s ruling to treat all states equally under the law and hope it will 
finally clear the way for Mississippi to implement our commonsense voter 
identification laws in a way that is fair to all citizens.”54 
Mississippi House Elections Committee Chairman Bill Denny expressed a 
similar sentiment: “I’ve always felt that [Section 5 of the VRA] was 
unconstitutional. . . . I would’ve agreed in 1965 that something had to be done, 
but it should’ve been done to all 50 states. I just always felt that was wrong, 
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that was a violation of the 10th Amendment to begin with, of states’ rights.”55 
South Carolina Representative Jeff Duncan, when asked about Shelby County, 
commented: “Today’s Supreme Court’s ruling invalidating the preclearance 
requirements contained within the Voting Rights Act is a win for fairness, 
South Carolina, and the rule of law. . . . The Court’s ruling will hopefully end 
the practice of treating states differently and recognizes that we live in 2013, 
not the 1960s.”56 South Carolina’s attorney general added, “This is a victory 
for all voters, as all states can now act equally, without some having to ask for 
permission or being required to jump through the extraordinary hoops 
demanded by federal bureaucracy.”57 
These statements are clearly in harmony with Chief Justice Roberts’s 
language in Shelby County. But the connection may be deeper than that. 
Consider the argument of James Read and Neal Allen regarding recent 
nullification efforts: 
Nullification may still be dead as far as the U.S. Supreme Court is concerned. 
But whether nullification theory is upheld in federal court is not the only 
question. States in the past have sometimes successfully obstructed federal 
laws and rulings for years despite consistently losing in court. And if the 
Court—still rejecting nullification—should overturn on other grounds some 
federal laws currently targeted by state nullification legislation, advocates of 
nullification would likely claim political vindication for their efforts.58 
Viewed accordingly, Shelby County can be read as animating earlier states’ 
rights efforts in the election law realm. Therefore, although recent state 
assertions of election law primacy may not technically constitute nullification 
or interposition, their logic is not entirely dissimilar. 
Put differently, while state election laws—such as voter identification 
laws—may not present direct resistance to the VRA, they tacitly impair the 
nation’s voting rights enforcement regime. Shelby County can be read as 
vindicating this impairment by overturning “on other grounds” Section 5 of the 
VRA. The other ground here is, of course, the equal sovereignty principle, a 
principle that James Blacksher and Lani Guinier refer to as “the oldest and 
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most demeaning official insult to African Americans in American 
constitutional history.”59 
In retrospect, the Court’s 2008 decision in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board60 regarding Indiana’s voter identification law was a harbinger. 
In Crawford, the plaintiffs alleged that Indiana’s law substantially burdened 
the right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 Justice Stevens 
authored the lead opinion, in which he employed the “balancing approach” 
derived from two Court decisions, Anderson v. Celebrezze62 and Burdick v. 
Takushi.63 This approach weighs a state’s interests against the burden imposed 
on voters. Justice Stevens’s opinion found the state’s interests in “deterring and 
detecting voter fraud,”64 and “protecting public confidence . . . in the integrity 
of the electoral process,”65 to be sufficient. Justice Scalia, concurring, asserted 
that it “is for state legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of possible 
changes to their election codes, and their judgment must prevail unless it 
imposes a severe and unjustified overall burden upon the right to vote, or is 
intended to disadvantage a particular class.”66 
The decision notably privileges state election law decision making. As 
noted by Ellen Katz, Crawford’s reasoning “gives States license to structure 
electoral processes to impose barriers to participation, subject only to the most 
limited constraint that they not be legally impossible to traverse.”67 Though the 
exact relationship between a decision like Crawford and Shelby County is 
difficult to identify,68 the momentum it built towards state sovereignty in 
election law is undeniable. Writing after Crawford but prior to NAMUDNO, 
Pamela Karlan aptly summarized the shift: 
[T]he justices who seemed most deferential to the Indiana Legislature’s 
judgment on how to strike the balance between the risk of disenfranchisement 
through fraudulent dilution and disenfranchisement through exclusion have 
expressed the greatest skepticism with respect to Congress’s decision to strike 
a different balance with respect to the risks of disenfranchisement in the 
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context of the Voting Rights Act. A challenge to the renewal and amendment 
of that statute is currently before the Court, and it will be interesting to see 
whether the Court accords as much deference to congressional fact-finding as 
it did to the Indiana Legislature’s conclusions.69 
As time revealed, in both NAMUDNO and in Shelby County, the Court was 
anything but deferential to congressional fact-finding. 
Consider also the “proof of citizenship” voter registration laws passed by 
the state of Arizona and the state of Kansas in 2004 and 2011, respectively. 
Both laws sought to require prospective voters to verify their citizenship in 
order to vote in both federal and state elections. Arizona litigated this issue all 
the way to the Court, which held in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 
Inc. that the National Voter Registration Act preempted Arizona’s registration 
law,70 thereby limiting the citizenship requirement to voting in state 
elections.71 At first glance, then, Arizona might seem to be an anti-states’ rights 
decision. Analyzed more closely, though, its confirmation of federal election 
law authority is arguably quite narrow. As Samuel Issacharoff recognized, 
“[w]hile confirming the plenary authority of Congress with regard to the time, 
place, and manner of voting in federal elections, the opinion took pains to 
distinguish the powers of the states to set voter qualifications under the 
Elections Clause.”72 
The trend, therefore, prior to Shelby County, was decidedly in favor of 
state sovereignty in election law. What was most striking about the decision 
was its complete disengagement from the doctrines that most experts 
anticipated would drive the case outcome. For example, most experts expected 
the Court’s City of Boerne v. Flores73 doctrine to govern the Court’s analysis.74 
Following Boerne, Congress’s enforcement power under the Reconstruction 
Amendments is limited to enacting preventive and remedial legislation that 
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demonstrates “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”75 
Oddly, the Court ignored this analysis entirely in deciding Shelby County. 
As summarized by Richard Hasen: “Perhaps the biggest surprise of Shelby 
County is that the majority purported to ignore this Boerne issue. The majority 
does not even cite to Boerne even though this has been a key issue involving 
the constitutionality of Section 5 for years.”76 Couple this omission with only 
passing references to the Tenth Amendment and the Elections Clause,77 and 
the equal sovereignty doctrine seems even more unmoored from standard 
election law doctrine. 
Which brings us back to the Read and Allen quote above. For champions 
of state sovereignty in election law, it may be unnecessary to challenge federal 
election laws through nullification or interposition. By earning victories on 
various grounds in cases like Crawford and Arizona, the reliance on the equal 
sovereignty principle in Shelby County seemed tenable. In other words, 
because the tide had shifted so starkly towards the privileging of state interests 
in election law matters, the decision in Shelby County seemed less of an outlier 
than it might have been. The final section, Part III, examines more closely 
some of the controversial voting laws passed by several states just prior to and 
immediately following the decision. 
III.  SUMMARIZING STATES’ RIGHTS IN ELECTIONS 
Given Shelby County’s transformative holding, most of the public and 
academic conversation since has focused on what has transpired in its wake.78 
And as I have argued here, the decision was uniquely consequential in both 
practical and ideational ways. But it is worth reiterating a point from above—
that some of the most controversial election law changes made by states in 
recent years actually preceded Shelby County.79 This is not to say that Shelby 
County did not influence the trajectory, momentum, or viability of those 
changes. It does, however, warrant acknowledgment. 
A number of commentators identify the 2010 midterm elections as a 
critical juncture. For instance, the Brennan Center for Justice points to the 
“highly partisan battle over voting rights” that “started after the 2010 midterm 
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elections, when new state legislative majorities pushed a wave of laws 
cracking down on voting.”80 According to its research, by the time of the 2012 
election, “19 states passed 27 restrictive voting measures,”81 and “a few 
months before the 2014 midterm elections, new voting restrictions [were] set 
to be in place in 22 states.”82 A closer look at what occurred in Wisconsin and 
South Carolina is instructive. 
In 2011, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker signed into law a strict voter 
identification requirement.83 Several groups, including the League of Women 
Voters, immediately brought a challenge. Since that time the law has been 
enforced just once and remains mired in litigation.84 South Carolina Governor 
Nikki Haley signed a similar bill into law, also in 2011.85 At the time, South 
Carolina was a covered state, and was therefore required to request 
preclearance. The Department of Justice denied approval to the voter 
identification law because it had the potential to disenfranchise minority 
voters.86 Following subsequent litigation, the voter identification law was 
approved, though its enforcement was delayed.87 
These scenarios might be distinguished from those in North Carolina, 
Texas, and Florida, where Shelby County itself had some observable effects. 
Consider North Carolina, which involves some of the most probative evidence 
of Shelby County’s influence. The North Carolina General Assembly first 
considered a voter identification bill in March 2013, three months prior to 
Shelby County. The bill proceeded rather quickly through both the general 
assembly and the North Carolina State Senate, which was already anticipating 
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a preclearance submission.88 Following the decision, however, a preclearance 
request was unnecessary. The Republican chairman of the rules committee, 
Thomas Apodaca, then stated, “So now we can go with the full bill.”89 
The “full bill,” which was eventually signed into law, contained both major 
changes to the voter identification bill90 as well as a number of new provisions, 
including reductions to early voting periods, the elimination of same-day 
registration, and modifications to provisional ballot rules.91 As in Wisconsin, 
the League of Women Voters, and others, challenged the law on both 
constitutional and statutory grounds. They found some success in the Fourth 
Circuit, but the Supreme Court ultimately restored the full law.92 The sequence 
of events provides strong support for the argument that Shelby County 
engendered the full set of election law changes that took effect in North 
Carolina. 
The Texas legislature was similarly attuned to Shelby County. Texas’s 
voter identification law went into effect in 2012.93 Because of its likely 
retrogressive impact, the D.C. Circuit rejected the law and denied Texas 
preclearance.94 A separate D.C. Circuit panel also rejected and denied 
preclearance to two of Texas’s 2011 redistricting plans.95 Just hours after the 
Court announced its decision in Shelby County, Texas Attorney General Greg 
Abbott asserted that both the state’s voter identification law and the 
redistricting maps would “take effect immediately.”96  A  federal  district  court 
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later found the voter identification law to constitute an unconstitutional poll 
tax,97 yet the Court again reversed and restored the law.98 
Finally, consider Florida in 2012, where Governor Rick Scott oversaw a 
program intended to purge noncitizens from the voting rolls.99 That effort was 
challenged by several organizations, including the American Civil Liberties 
Union, which argued that Florida had failed to obtain preclearance for the 
program.100 Shelby County cleared the way for Florida to move forward with 
the program, bolstering Florida’s efforts.101 Early last year the Eleventh Circuit 
found the implementation of the purge to violate the National Voter 
Registration Act, but the program is still viable.102 
So again, the observable effects of Shelby County in North Carolina, 
Texas, and Florida, to take just three leading examples, are visible in a way 
that is distinguishable from those in Wisconsin and South Carolina. With that 
said, Shelby County is still relevant to the latter cases. The decision upended 
the voting rights enforcement regime, and through its characterization of states 
as autonomous election law entities, encouraged state election law 
recalcitrance going forward. As our nation’s highest court, the Supreme Court 
has a special narrative function. The narrative contained in Shelby County is 
that decidedly partisan state attempts to restrict the franchise are legitimate, 
even normatively desirable, exercises of states’ authority. In some cases, the 
decision’s observable effects are quite obvious. But even beyond those cases, 
the decision represents a sea change in how we think about election law 
matters. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the run-up to Shelby County, much of the conversation involved the 
question of whether Section 2 of the VRA could serve as an adequate 
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substitute for Section 5.103 Section 2, by comparison, applies nationwide. It 
forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure . . . which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account 
of race or color.”104 Yet unlike the now impotent Section 5, Section 2 places 
the primary evidentiary burden on plaintiffs. Section 2 is the nucleus of 
modern private voting rights litigation.105 
The operative presumption of Section 5’s opponents seemed to be that 
Section 5 was constitutionally problematic, but Section 2 was constitutionally 
sound. Now, of course, questions are being raised about Section 2’s 
constitutionality.106 Opponents argue that it is too broad and goes beyond what 
Congress is permitted to do under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
powers.107 A challenge of this type would have been unlikely absent Shelby 
County. The message that case sent was that the VRA is vulnerable, and that 
the Court is more than willing, perhaps even eager, to scrutinize its operation. 
In this new climate, states are privileged and given great latitude in managing 
voting and elections. It will require active involvement on the part of many to 
preserve federal oversight. 
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